On the Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in the Interference Channel with Noisy Feedback by Quintero, Victor et al.
HAL Id: hal-01492979
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01492979v2
Submitted on 11 May 2017
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
On the Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in the Interference
Channel with Noisy Feedback
Victor Quintero, Samir Perlaza, Jean-Marie Gorce
To cite this version:
Victor Quintero, Samir Perlaza, Jean-Marie Gorce. On the Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in the Inter-
ference Channel with Noisy Feedback. European Wireless 2017. Workshop: COCOA – COmpetitive
and COoperative Approaches for 5G networks., May 2017, Dresden, Germany. ￿hal-01492979v2￿
1
On the Efficiency of Nash Equilibria in the
Interference Channel with Noisy Feedback
Victor Quintero, Samir M. Perlaza, and Jean-Marie Gorce
Abstract—In this paper, the price of anarchy (PoA) and the
price of stability (PoS) of the η-Nash equilibria (η-NEs), of the
two-user linear deterministic interference channel (IC) with noisy
channel-output feedback are characterized for all η > 0. The
price of anarchy is the ratio between the sum-rate capacity and
the smallest sum-rate at an η-NE. Alternatively, the price of
stability is the ratio between the sum-rate capacity and the
biggest sum-rate at an η-NE. Some of the main conclusions
of this work are the following: (a) When both transmitter-
receiver pairs are in the low-interference regime, the PoA can be
made arbitrarily close to one as η approaches zero, subject to
a particular condition. More specifically, there are scenarios in
which even the worst η-NE (in terms of sum-rate) is arbitrarily
close to the Pareto boundary of the capacity region. (b) The
use of feedback plays a fundamental role on increasing the
PoA in some interference regimes. This is basically because in
these regimes, the use of feedback increases the sum-capacity,
whereas the smallest sum-rate at an η-NE remains the same
as in the case without feedback. (c) The PoS is equal to one
in all the interference regimes. This implies that there always
exists an η-NE in the Pareto boundary of the capacity region.
The conclusions of this work reveal the relevance of jointly
using equilibrium selection methods and channel-output feedback
for reducing the effect of anarchical behavior of the network
components in the η-NE sum-rate of the interference channel.
Index Terms—Nash equilibrium, Linear Deterministic Inter-
ference Channel, Price of Anarchy, Price of Stability.
I. LINEAR DETERMINISTIC INTERFERENCE CHANNEL
WITH NOISY CHANNEL-OUTPUT FEEDBACK
Consider the two-user decentralized linear deterministic
interference channel with noisy channel-output feedback (D-
LD-IC-NOF) depicted in Figure 1. For all i ∈ {1, 2}, with
j ∈ {1, 2}\{i}, the number of bit-pipes between transmitter i
and its corresponding intended receiver is denoted by −→n ii; the
number of bit-pipes between transmitter i and its correspond-
ing non-intended receiver is denoted by nji; and the number of
bit-pipes between receiver i and its corresponding transmitter
is denoted by ←−n ii. These six non-negative integer parameters
describe the LD-IC-NOF in Figure 1.
At transmitter i, the channel-input Xi,n at channel use n,
with n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Ni}, is a q-dimensional binary vector
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Fig. 1. Two-user linear deterministic interference channel with noisy channel-











∈ Xi, with Xi = {0, 1}q ,
q=max (−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21) , (1)
and Ni ∈ N is the block-length of transmitter-receiver pair i.
At receiver i, the channel-output
−→
Y i,n at channel use n, with

















. Let S be a q × q
binary lower shift matrix of the form:
S =

0 0 0 · · · 0
1 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 0 · · ·
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
0 · · · 0 1 0
 . (2)
The input-output relation during channel use n is given by
−→
Y i,n=S
q−−→n iiXi,n + S
q−nijXj,n, (3)
where Xi,n = (0, 0, . . . , 0)
T for all n > Ni. The feedback
signal
←−







where d ∈ N is a finite delay and additions and multiplications
are defined over the binary field.
Without any loss of generality, the feedback delay is as-
sumed to be equal to one channel use, i.e., d = 1. Let Wi
be the set of message indices of transmitter i. Transmitter
2
i sends the message index Wi ∈ Wi by transmitting the
codeword Xi = (Xi,1,Xi,2, . . . ,Xi,Ni) ∈ XNii , which is a
binary q×Ni matrix. The encoder of transmitter i can be mod-
eled as a set of deterministic mappings f (N)i,1 , f
(N)




with f (N)i,1 :Wi×N→ {0, 1}q and for all n ∈ {2, 3, . . . , Ni},
f
(N)





















where Ωi is a randomly generated index known by both
transmitter i and receiver i, while unknown by transmitter j
and receiver j.
The decoder of receiver i is defined by a determin-
istic function ψ(N)i : {0, 1}q×N × N → Wi. At the









and Ωi to obtain











. Let Wi be written
as ci,1 ci,2 . . . ci,Mi in binary form, with Mi = dlog2 |Wi|e.
Let also Ŵi be written as ĉi,1 ĉi,2 . . . ĉi,Mi in binary form.
A transmit-receive configuration for transmitter-receiver
pair i, denoted by si, can be described in terms of the block-
length Ni, the number of bits per block Mi, the channel-





i,2 , . . . , f
(N)
i,Ni
, the decoding function ψ(N)i , etc.
The average bit error probability at decoder i given the







Within this context, a rate pair (R1, R2) ∈ R2+ is said to be
achievable if it complies with the following definition.
Definition 1 (Achievable Rate Pairs): A rate pair (R1, R2) ∈
R2+ is achievable if there exists at least one pair of configu-
rations (s1, s2) such that the decoding bit error probabilities
p1(s1, s2) and p2(s1, s2) can be made arbitrarily small by
letting the block-lengths N1 and N2 grow to infinity.
The aim of transmitter i is to autonomously choose its
transmit-receive configuration si, in order to maximize its
achievable rate Ri(s1, s2). Note that the rate achieved by
transmitter-receiver i depends on both configurations s1 and
s2 due to mutual interference. This reveals the competitive
interaction between both links in the decentralized interference
channel. The following section models this interaction using
tools from game theory.
II. THE TWO-USER INTERFERENCE CHANNEL AS A GAME
The competitive interaction of the two transmitter-receiver
pairs in the decentralized interference channel can be modeled
by the following game in normal-form:
G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
. (7)
The set K = {1, 2} is the set of players, that is, the set of
transmitter-receiver pairs. The sets A1 and A2 are the sets of
actions of players 1 and 2, respectively. An action of a player
i ∈ K, which is denoted by si ∈ Ai, is basically its transmit-
receive configuration as described above. The utility function
of player i is ui : A1 × A2 → R+ and it is defined as the






, if pi(s1, s2) < ε
0, otherwise,
(8)
where ε > 0 is an arbitrarily small number. This game
formulation was first proposed in [1] and [2].
A class of transmit-receive configurations s∗ = (s∗1, s
∗
2) ∈
A1×A2 that are particularly important in the analysis of this
game is referred to as the set of η-Nash equilibria (η-NE),
with η > 0. This type of configuration satisfy the following
definition.
Definition 2 (η-Nash equilibrium): In the game
G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
, an action profile (s∗1, s
∗
2)
is an η-Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ K and for all si ∈ Ai,
there exits an η > 0 such that
ui(si, s
∗




j ) + η. (9)
Let (s∗1, s
∗
2) be an η-Nash equilibrium action profile of the
game in (7). Then, none of the transmitters can increase its
own information transmission rate more than η bits per channel
use by changing its own transmit-receive configuration and
keeping the average bit error probability arbitrarily close to
zero. Note that for η sufficiently large, from Definition 2, any
pair of configurations can be an η-NE. Alternatively, for η = 0,
the classical definition of Nash equilibrium is obtained [3]. In
this case, if a pair of configurations is a Nash equilibrium
(η = 0), then each individual configuration is optimal with
respect to each other. Hence, the interest is to describe the set
of all possible η-NE rate pairs (R1, R2) of the game in (7) with
the smallest η for which there exists at least one equilibrium
configuration pair. The set of rate pairs that can be achieved
at an η-NE is known as the η-Nash equilibrium region.
Definition 3 (η-NE Region): Let η > 0 be fixed. An achiev-
able rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be in the η-NE region of
the game G =
(
K, {Ak}k∈K , {uk}k∈K
)
if there exists a pair
(s∗1, s
∗









2) = R2. (10)
The η-NE region of the game in (7) is characterized in
[4] in terms of two regions: the capacity region, denoted
by C(−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22), and a convex region,
denoted by Bη(−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22). This region
was first characterized in [5] for the case without feedback
and in [6] for the case of perfect channel-output feedback.
In the following, the tuple (−→n 11, −→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22)
is used only when needed. The capacity region C of the two-
user LD-IC-NOF is described in Lemma 1 (at the top of the








Lemma 1 (Theorem 1 in [7]): The capacity region C(−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22) of the two-user LD-IC-NOF is the set
of non-negative rate pairs (R1, R2) that satisfy for all i ∈ {1, 2}, with j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}:
Ri 6min (max (
−→n ii, nji) ,max (−→n ii, nij)) , (11a)
Ri 6min
Ä
max (−→n ii, nji) ,max
Ä−→n ii,←−n jj − (−→n jj − nji)+ää , (11b)
R1 +R2 6min
Ä













−→n ii, nji)+(−→n ii−nij)++max
(























−(max(−→n jj ,nji)−←−n jj)+
ã+)+
+η,
with i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}.
The following lemma characterizes the η-NE region of the
two-user LD-IC-NOF.
Lemma 2 (Theorem 1 in [4]): Let η > 0 be fixed. The η-
NE region of the two-user LD-IC-NOF with parameters −→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21, ←−n 11 and ←−n 22, is
Nη = C ∩ Bη. (14)
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Definitions
Let αi ∈ Q be the interference parameter of transmitter-





The scenario in which the desired signal is stronger than
the interference (αi < 1) is referred to as the low-interference
regime (LIR). Alternatively, the scenario in which the desired
signal is weaker than or equal to the interference (αi > 1)
is referred to as the high-interference regime (HIR). The
main results of this paper are presented using a list of events
(Boolean variables) that are fully determined by the parameters−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, and n21. The event in which the number of
interference-free bit-pipes at receiver i is bigger than or equal
to the number of bit pipes in the cross-interference link in
receiver j is denoted by A1,i, i.e.,
A1,i:
−→n ii − nij>nji. (16)
The event in which the number of bit-pipes from transmitter
i to receiver i is bigger than or equal to the number of bit pipes




In the following, given an event, e.g. A2,i : −→n ii > nji,
the notation A2,i implies −→n ii < nji (logical complement).
Combining the events (16) and (17), ten different conditions
are identified:
B1 : A1,1 ∧A1,2, (18a)
B2,i: A1,i ∧A1,j ∧A2,j , (18b)
B3,i: A1,i ∧A1,j ∧A2,j , (18c)
B4 : A1,1 ∧A1,2 ∧A2,1 ∧A2,2, (18d)
B5,i: A1,1 ∧A1,2 ∧A2,i ∧A2,j , (18e)
B6 : A1,1 ∧A1,2 ∧A2,2 ∧A2,2, (18f)
B7 : A1,1, (18g)
B8 : A1,1 ∧A2,1 ∧A2,2, (18h)
B9 : A1,1 ∧A2,1 ∧A2,2, (18i)
B10 : A1,1 ∧A2,2. (18j)
For all i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} when both transmitter-
receiver pairs are in the LIR, i.e., −→n 11 > n12 and −→n 22 > n21,
the events B1, B2,i, B3,i, B4, B5,i, and B6 exhibit the property
stated by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Both transmitter-receiver pairs are in the LIR):
For all i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} and for all
(−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21) ∈ N4 with −→n 11 > n12 and −→n 22 > n21,
only one of the events B1, B2,i, B3,i, B4, B5,i, and B6 holds
true.
Proof: The proof follows from verifying that for all i ∈
{1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}, when both transmitter-receiver
pairs are in the LIR, i.e., −→n 11 > n12 and −→n 22 > n21, the
events (18a)-(18f) are mutually exclusive.
For all i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2}\{i} when transmitter-receiver
pair 1 is in the LIR and transmitter-receiver pair 2 is in the
HIR, i.e., −→n 11 > n12 and −→n 22 6 n21, the events B7, B8, B9,
and B10 exhibit the property stated by the following lemma.
Lemma 4 (Transmitter-receiver pair 1 in the LIR and
transmitter-receiver pair 2 in the HIR): For all i ∈ {1, 2},
j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} and for all (−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21) ∈ N4 with−→n 11 > n12 and −→n 22 6 n21, only one of the events B7, B8,
B9, and B10 holds true.
Proof: The proof of Lemma 4 follows along the same
lines of the proof of Lemma 3.
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IV. MAIN RESULTS: EFFICIENCY OF AN η-NE
This section characterizes the efficiency of the set of η-
NEs of the game in (7) using two metrics: price of anarchy
(PoA) and price of stability (PoS). The PoA measures the
loss of performance due to decentralization by comparing
the maximum sum-rate achieved by a centralized LD-IC-NOF
with the minimum sum-rate achieved by a decentralized LD-
IC-NOF at an η-NE. Alternatively, the PoS measures the
loss of performance due to decentralization by comparing
the maximum sum-rate achieved by a centralized LD-IC-NOF
with the maximum sum-rate achieved by a decentralized LD-
IC-NOF at an η-NE [8].
A. Price of Anarchy
Let A = A1 ×A2 be the set of all possible action profiles
and Aη−NE ⊂ A be the set of η-NE strategies of the game in
(7) (Definition 2).
Definition 4 (Price of Anarchy [9]): Let η > 0. The PoA of



















Let ΣC denote the solution to the optimization problem in
the numerator of (19), which correspond to the maximum sum-
rate in the centralized case. Let also ΣN denote the solution to
the optimization problem in the denominator of (19). Closed-
form expressions of ΣC and ΣN are presented in [4].
The following theorems describe the PoA (η,G) in partic-
ular interference regimes of the LD-IC-NOF. In all the cases,
it is assumed that ←−n ii 6 max (−→n ii, nij) for all i ∈ {1, 2}
and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}. If ←−n 11 > max (−→n 11, n12) or ←−n 22 >
max (−→n 22, n21), the analysis is the same as in the case of
perfect channel-output feedback, i.e., ←−n 11 = max (−→n 11, n12)
or ←−n 22 = max (−→n 22, n21).
Theorem 1 (Both transmitter-receiver pairs in the LIR):
For all i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i} and for all

























−→n 22+−→n 11−n12,−→n 11+−→n 22−n21,
max
(−→n 11 − n12,←−n 11)+ max(−→n 22 − n21,←−n 22),
2−→n 11 − n12 + max
(−→n 22 − n21,←−n 22),
2−→n 22 − n21 + max
(−→n 11 − n12,←−n 11)); (21a)
ΣC2,i=min
(
−→n 22 +−→n 11 − n12,−→n 11 +−→n 22 − n21,
max
(−→n 11 − n12,←−n 11)+ max(−→n 22 − n21,←−n 22),






2−→n jj − nji + max
(−→n ii − nij ,←−n ii)); (21b)
ΣC3=min
(

























−→n 11 − n12 +−→n 22 − n21 − 2η. (21d)
Proof: The proof is presented in [4].
From Theorem 1, the following conclusions can be drawn.
When both transmitter-receiver pairs are in the LIR, and
at least one of the conditions B3,i, B5,i, or B6 holds true,
with i ∈ {1, 2} and j ∈ {1, 2} \ {i}, then the PoA (η,G)
does not depend on the feedback parameters ←−n 11 and ←−n 22.
However, this is not always the case as shown in the following
corollaries.
Corollary 1: For any (−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22) ∈










−→n 11 +−→n 22 − n12 − n21, and (23)
ΣC5=
−→n 11 +−→n 22 −max (n12, n21) . (24)
The lower bound in (22) is obtained assuming that←−n 11 = 0
and ←−n 22 = 0 in (20). That is, when feedback is not available.
The upper bound in (22) is obtained assuming that ←−n 11 =
max (−→n 11, n12) = −→n 11 and ←−n 22 = max (−→n 22, n21) = −→n 22
in (20). That is, when perfect channel-output feedback is
available at both transmitter-receiver pairs.
Note also that for any η arbitrarily small, when both
transmitter-receiver pairs are in the LIR; condition B1 holds
5
true; ←−n 11 6 −→n 11 − n12; and ←−n 22 6 −→n 22 − n21, the sum-
rate capacity approaches to the minimum sum-rate at an η-
NE (PoA (η,G) ≈ 1). Alternatively, when both transmitter-
receiver pairs are in the LIR; condition B1 holds true; and
at least one the following conditions: ←−n 11 > −→n 11 − n12
or ←−n 22 > −→n 22 − n21 holds true, the use of feedback
in transmitter-receiver pair 1 or transmitter-receiver pair 2,
respectively, enlarges both the capacity region and the η-NE
region. Nonetheless, the PoA increases as the smallest sum-
rate at an η-NE remains unchanged with respect to the case
without feedback.
Corollary 2: For any (−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22) ∈
N6 with −→n 11 > n12 and −→n 22 > n21, that satisfies B2,i for







Note that when both transmitter-receiver pairs are in the
LIR and for a given i ∈ {1, 2} condition B2,i holds true;←−n ii 6 −→n ii − nij ; and ←−n jj 6 nij , the use of feedback in
either transmitter-receiver pair does not enlarge the capacity
region or the η-NE region. Then, the PoA (η,G) is equal to
the lower bound in (25), i.e., PoA (η,G) = −→n iiΣ
N1
. Conversely,
when both transmitter-receiver pairs are in the LIR and for a
given i ∈ {1, 2} condition B2,i holds true; and at least one of
the following conditions:←−n ii > −→n ii−nij or←−n jj > nij holds
true, the use of feedback enlarges both the capacity region and
the η-NE region.
The lower and upper bounds in (25) are obtained as in the
case of (22).
Corollary 3: For any (−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22) ∈











Note that when both transmitter-receiver pairs are in the
LIR; condition B4 holds true; and ΣC5 6 n12 +n21, then the
PoA (η,G) does not depend on the feedback parameters ←−n 11
and←−n 22. When both transmitter-receiver pairs are in the LIR;
condition B4 holds true; ΣC5 > n12 + n21; ←−n 11 6 n21; and←−n 22 6 n12, then the PoA (η,G) is equal to the lower bound
in (26), i.e., PoA (η,G) = n12+n21ΣN1 . Conversely, when both
transmitter-receiver pairs are in the LIR; condition B4 holds
true; ΣC5 > n12 + n21; and at least one of the following
conditions: ←−n 11 > n21 or ←−n 22 > n12 holds true, the use of
feedback in transmitter-receiver pair 1 or transmitter-receiver
pair 2, respectively, enlarges the capacity region and the η-NE
region.
Theorem 2 (Transmitter-receiver pair 1 in the LIR
and transmitter-receiver pair 2 in the HIR): For all
(−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22) ∈ N6 with −→n 11 > n12 and












Note that in the cases in which transmitter-receiver pair 1
is in the LIR and transmitter-receiver pair 2 is in the HIR,
the PoA (η,G) does not depend on the feedback parameters.
This is basically because the use of feedback in this scenario
can enlarge the capacity region but it does not increase the
sum-rate capacity (Theorem 4 in [10]).
In the case in which transmitter-receiver pair 1 is in the
HIR and transmitter-receiver pair 2 is in the LIR, i.e., −→n 11 6
n12 and −→n 22 > n21, the PoA (η,G) for the D-LD-IC-NOF
is characterized as in Theorem 2 interchanging the indices of
the parameters.
Theorem 3 (Both transmitter-receiver pairs in the HIR): For
all (−→n 11,−→n 22, n12, n21,←−n 11,←−n 22) ∈ N6 with −→n 11 6 n12
and −→n 22 6 n21, the PoA (η,G) satisfies:
PoA (η,G) =∞. (28)
The result on Theorem 3 is due to the fact that
((−→n 11 −
n12
)+ − η)+ + ((−→n 22 − n21)+ − η)+ = 0. That is, when
−→n 11 6 n12 and −→n 22 6 n21, none of the transmitter-receiver
pairs is able to transmit at a strictly positive rate at the worst
η-NE, i.e., ΣN=0.
In general, in any interference regime in which the
PoA (η,G) depends on the feedback parameters ←−n 11 or ←−n 22,
there exist a value in the feedback parameter←−n 11 or the feed-
back parameter ←−n 22 beyond which the PoA (η,G) increases.
These values correspond to those values beyond which the
sum capacity can be enlarged (Theorem 4 in [10]).
B. Price of Stability
In this section, the efficiency of the η-NEs of the game G
in (7) is analyzed by using the PoS.
Definition 5 (Price of stability [11]): Let η > 0. The PoS of



















Let ΣN denote the solution to the optimization problem in
the denominator of (29). A closed-form expression of ΣN is
presented in [4].
The following proposition characterizes the PoS of the game
G in (7) for the LD-IC-NOF.
Proposition 1 (PoS): For all (−→n 11, −→n 22, n12, n21, ←−n 11,←−n 22) ∈ N6 and for all η > 0 arbitrary small, the PoS in the
game G of the LD-IC-NOF is:
PoS (η,G)=1. (30)
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Note that the fact that the price of stability is equal to one,
independently of the parameters −→n 11, −→n 22, n12, n21, ←−n 11
and ←−n 22, implies that despite the anarchical behavior of both
transmitter-receiver pairs, the biggest η-NE sum-rate is equal
to the sum-rate capacity, i.e., ΣC = ΣNη . This implies that in
all interference regimes, there always exist at least one Pareto
optimal η-NE.
V. SYMMETRIC GAME
Denote by PoANFS (G) the PoA of the game (7) with an
arbitrarily small value of η, i.e.,
PoANFS (G) = lim
η → 0
PoA (η,G) , (31)
and symmetric conditions, i.e.,−→n 11 = −→n 22 = −→n , n12 =
n21 = m, and ←−n 11 = ←−n 22 = ←−n . Let α and β be the
normalized parameters of the symmetric LD-IC-NOF, i.e.,
α = m−→n and β =
←−n−→n . The PoANFS (G) can be obtained as
a special case of Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 as shown by the
following corollary.
Corollary 4 (Corollaries 1, 2, 3 and 4 in [8]): The















if 1− α < β 6 1
2−α
2(1−α) if β > 1;
(32a)



















if α < β 6 1
2−α
2(1−α) if β > 1;
(32b)








2 (1− α) ; (32c)
and for all α ∈ [1,∞):
PoANFS (G) =∞. (32d)
Denote by PoAWFS (G) the PoA of the game in (7) with
an arbitrarily small value of η, i.e.,
PoAWFS (G) = lim
η → 0
β → 0
PoA (η,G) , (33)
without feedback, i.e., ←−n 11 = ←−n 22 = 0, and symmetric
conditions, i.e., −→n 11 = −→n 22 = −→n and n12 = n21 = m. The
PoAWFS (G) can be obtained as a special case of Theorem 1
and Theorem 3 as shown by the following corollary.
Corollary 5 (PoA without feedback under symmetric condi-
tions in [12]): The PoAWFS (G) satisfies:
PoAWFS =











3 < α < 1,
∞ if α > 1.
(34)
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The PoA and the PoS of the η-NE of the two-user LD-IC-
NOF have been characterized, with η > 0 arbitrarily small.
It has been shown that when both transmitter-receiver pairs
are in the LIR, the PoA can be made arbitrarily close to one
as η approaches zero, subject to a particular condition. This
immediately implies that in this regime even the worst η-
NE (in terms of sum-rate) is arbitrarily close to the Pareto
boundary of the capacity region. More importantly, it has
been shown that the use of feedback increases the PoA in
some interference regimes. This is basically because in these
regimes, the use of feedback increases the sum-capacity, where
as the smallest sum-rate at an η-NE is not changed with
respect to the case without feedback. In some cases, the
PoA can be infinity due to the fact that both transmitter-
receiver pairs are in the HIR, the smallest sum-rate at an η-
NE is zero bits per channel use. In other regimes, the use
of feedback does not have any impact in the PoA as it does
not increase the sum-capacity. Finally, the PoS is shown to
be equal to one in all interference regimes. This implies that
there always exists an η-NE in the Pareto boundary of the
capacity region. The main results of this work highlight the
relevance of designing equilibrium selection methods such that
decentralized networks can operate at efficient η-NE points.
The need of these methods becomes more relevant when
channel-output feedback is available as it might increase the
PoA.
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Alpes, Lyon, France, Tech. Rep. 8862, Mar. 2016.
[11] E. Anshelevich, A. Dasgupta, E. Tardos, and T. Wexler, “Near-optimal
network design with selfish agents,” in Proc. Annual ACM Symposium
on Theory of Computing, San Diego, CA, USA, Jun. 2003.
[12] S. Saha and R. Berry, “On information theoretic games for interference
networks,” in Proc. 44th Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems and
Computers, Pacific Grove, CA, USA, Nov. 2010.
